Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses

Executive Order 13865 of March 26, 2019

Coordinating National Resilience to
                Electromagnetic Pulses

                By the authority vested in me as President by the
                Constitution and the laws of the United States of
                America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

                Section 1. Purpose. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) has
                the potential to disrupt, degrade, and damage
                technology and critical infrastructure systems. Human-
                made or naturally occurring EMPs can affect large
                geographic areas, disrupting elements critical to the
                Nation's security and economic prosperity, and could
                adversely affect global commerce and stability. The
                Federal Government must foster sustainable, efficient,
                and cost-effective approaches to improving the Nation's
                resilience to the effects of EMPs.

                Sec. 2. Definitions. As used in this order:

                    (a) “Critical infrastructure” means systems and
                assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the
                United States that the incapacity or destruction of
                such systems and assets would have a debilitating
                impact on security, national economic security,
                national public health or safety, or any combination of
                those matters.
                    (b) “Electromagnetic pulse” is a burst of
                electromagnetic energy. EMPs have the potential to
                negatively affect technology systems on Earth and in
                space. A high-altitude EMP (HEMP) is a type of human-
                made EMP that occurs when a nuclear device is detonated
                at approximately 40 kilometers or more above the
                surface of Earth. A geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) is a
                type of natural EMP driven by a temporary disturbance
                of Earth's magnetic field resulting from interactions
                with solar eruptions. Both HEMPs and GMDs can affect
                large geographic areas.
                    (c) “National Critical Functions” means the
                functions of government and the private sector so vital
                to the United States that their disruption, corruption,
                or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on
                security, national economic security, national public
                health or safety, or any combination thereof.
                    (d) “National Essential Functions” means the
                overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government
                to lead and sustain the Nation before, during, and in
                the aftermath of a catastrophic emergency, such as an
                EMP that adversely affects the performance of
                Government.
                    (e) “Prepare” and “preparedness” mean the
                actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and
                exercise to build and sustain the capabilities
                necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the
                effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats
                that pose the greatest risk to the security of the
                Nation. These terms include the prediction and
                notification of impending EMPs.
                    (f) A “Sector-Specific Agency” (SSA) is the
                Federal department or agency that is responsible for
                providing institutional knowledge and specialized
                expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or
                supporting the security and resilience programs and
                associated activities of its designated critical
                infrastructure sector in the all-hazards environment.
                The SSAs are those identified in Presidential Policy
                Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical
                Infrastructure Security and Resilience).

                Sec. 3. Policy. (a) It is the policy of the United
                States to prepare for the effects of EMPs through
                targeted approaches that coordinate whole-of-government
                activities and encourage private-sector engagement. The
                Federal Government must provide warning of an impending
                EMP; protect against, respond

                to, and recover from the effects of an EMP through
                public and private engagement, planning, and
                investment; and prevent adversarial events through
                deterrence, defense, and nuclear nonproliferation
                efforts. To achieve these goals, the Federal Government
                shall engage in risk-informed planning, prioritize
                research and development (R&D) to address the needs of
                critical infrastructure stakeholders, and, for
                adversarial threats, consult Intelligence Community
                assessments.

                    (b) To implement the actions directed in this
                order, the Federal Government shall promote
                collaboration and facilitate information sharing,
                including the sharing of threat and vulnerability
                assessments, among executive departments and agencies
                (agencies), the owners and operators of critical
                infrastructure, and other relevant stakeholders, as
                appropriate. The Federal Government shall also provide
                incentives, as appropriate, to private-sector partners
                to encourage innovation that strengthens critical
                infrastructure against the effects of EMPs through the
                development and implementation of best practices,
                regulations, and appropriate guidance.

                Sec. 4. Coordination. (a) The Assistant to the
                President for National Security Affairs (APNSA),
                through National Security Council staff and in
                consultation with the Director of the Office of Science
                and Technology Policy (OSTP), shall coordinate the
                development and implementation of executive branch
                actions to assess, prioritize, and manage the risks of
                EMPs. The APNSA shall, on an annual basis, submit a
                report to the President summarizing progress on the
                implementation of this order, identifying gaps in
                capability, and recommending how to address those gaps.

                    (b) To further the Federal R&D necessary to prepare
                the Nation for the effects of EMPs, the Director of
                OSTP shall coordinate efforts of agencies through the
                National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). The
                Director of OSTP, through the NSTC, shall annually
                review and assess the R&D needs of agencies conducting
                preparedness activities for EMPs, consistent with this
                order.

                Sec. 5. Roles and Responsibilities. (a) The Secretary
                of State shall:

(i) lead the coordination of diplomatic efforts with United States allies
and international partners regarding enhancing resilience to the effects of
EMPs; and

(ii) in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other
relevant agencies, strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and deterrence
efforts, which would reduce the likelihood of an EMP attack on the United
States or its allies and partners by limiting the availability of nuclear
devices.

                    (b) The Secretary of Defense shall:

(i) in cooperation with the heads of relevant agencies and with United
States allies, international partners, and private-sector entities as
appropriate, improve and develop the ability to rapidly characterize,
attribute, and provide warning of EMPs, including effects on space systems
of interest to the United States;

(ii) provide timely operational observations, analyses, forecasts, and
other products for naturally occurring EMPs to support the mission of the
Department of Defense along with United States allies and international
partners, including the provision of alerts and warnings for natural EMPs
that may affect weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the
United States;

(iii) conduct R&D and testing to understand the effects of EMPs on
Department of Defense systems and infrastructure, improve capabilities to
model and simulate the environments and effects of EMPs, and develop
technologies to protect Department of Defense systems and infrastructure
from the effects of EMPs to ensure the successful execution of Department
of Defense missions;

(iv) review and update existing EMP-related standards for Department of
Defense systems and infrastructure, as appropriate;

(v) share technical expertise and data regarding EMPs and their potential
effects with other agencies and with the private sector, as appropriate;

(vi) incorporate attacks that include EMPs as a factor in defense planning
scenarios; and

(vii) defend the Nation from adversarial EMPs originating outside of the
United States through defense and deterrence, consistent with the mission
and national security policy of the Department of Defense.

                    (c) The Secretary of the Interior shall support the
                research, development, deployment, and operation of
                capabilities that enhance understanding of variations
                of Earth's magnetic field associated with EMPs.
                    (d) The Secretary of Commerce shall:

(i) provide timely and accurate operational observations, analyses,
forecasts, and other products for natural EMPs, exclusive of the
responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense set forth in subsection
(b)(ii) of this section; and

(ii) use the capabilities of the Department of Commerce, the private
sector, academia, and nongovernmental organizations to continuously improve
operational forecasting services and the development of standards for
commercial EMP technology.

                    (e) The Secretary of Energy shall conduct early-
                stage R&D, develop pilot programs, and partner with
                other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate,
                to characterize sources of EMPs and their couplings to
                the electric power grid and its subcomponents,
                understand associated potential failure modes for the
                energy sector, and coordinate preparedness and
                mitigation measures with energy sector partners.
                    (f) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

(i) provide timely distribution of information on EMPs and credible
associated threats to Federal, State, and local governments, critical
infrastructure owners and operators, and other stakeholders;

(ii) in coordination with the heads of any relevant SSAs, use the results
of risk assessments to better understand and enhance resilience to the
effects of EMPs across all critical infrastructure sectors, including
coordinating the identification of national critical functions and the
prioritization of associated critical infrastructure at greatest risk to
the effects of EMPs;

(iii) coordinate response to and recovery from the effects of EMPs on
critical infrastructure, in coordination with the heads of appropriate
SSAs;

(iv) incorporate events that include EMPs as a factor in preparedness
scenarios and exercises;

(v) in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, conduct R&D to better
understand and more effectively model the effects of EMPs on national
critical functions and associated critical infrastructure--excluding
Department of Defense systems and infrastructure--and develop technologies
and guidelines to enhance these functions and better protect this
infrastructure;

(vi) maintain survivable means to provide necessary emergency information
to the public during and after EMPs; and

(vii) in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and
informed by intelligence-based threat assessments, develop quadrennial risk
assessments on EMPs, with the first risk assessment delivered within 1 year
of the date of this order.

                    (g) The Director of National Intelligence shall:

(i) coordinate the collection, analysis, and promulgation, as appropriate,
of intelligence-based assessments on adversaries' capabilities to conduct
an attack utilizing an EMP and the likelihood of such an attack; and

(ii) provide intelligence-based threat assessments to support the heads of
relevant SSAs in the development of quadrennial risk assessments on EMPs.

                    (h) The heads of all SSAs, in coordination with the
                Secretary of Homeland Security, shall enhance and
                facilitate information sharing with private-sector
                counterparts, as appropriate, to enhance preparedness
                for the effects of EMPs, to identify and share
                vulnerabilities, and to work collaboratively to reduce
                vulnerabilities.
                    (i) The heads of all agencies that support National
                Essential Functions shall ensure that their all-hazards
                preparedness planning sufficiently addresses EMPs,
                including through mitigation, response, and recovery,
                as directed by national preparedness policy.

                Sec. 6. Implementation. (a) Identifying national
                critical functions and associated priority critical
                infrastructure at greatest risk.

(i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and other agencies as
appropriate, shall identify and list the national critical functions and
associated priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets,
including space-based assets that, if disrupted, could reasonably result in
catastrophic national or regional effects on public health or safety,
economic security, or national security. The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall update this list as necessary.

(ii) Within 1 year of the identification described in subsection (a)(i) of
this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the
heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall, using appropriate government
and private-sector standards for EMPs, assess which identified critical
infrastructure systems, networks, and assets are most vulnerable to the
effects of EMPs. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide this list
to the President, through the APNSA. The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall update this list using the results produced pursuant to subsection
(b) of this section, and as necessary thereafter.

                    (b) Improving understanding of the effects of EMPs.

(i) Within 180 days of the identification described in subsection (a)(ii)
of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
the heads of SSAs and in consultation with the Director of OSTP and the
heads of other appropriate agencies, shall review test data--identifying
any gaps in such data--regarding the effects of EMPs on critical
infrastructure systems, networks, and assets representative of those
throughout the Nation.

(ii) Within 180 days of identifying the gaps in existing test data, as
directed by subsection (b)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and in consultation with
the Director of OSTP and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall use
the sector partnership structure identified in the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan to develop an integrated cross-sector plan to address the
identified gaps. The heads of agencies identified in the plan shall
implement the plan in collaboration with the private sector, as
appropriate.

(iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and as appropriate
thereafter, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of
other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, shall review
existing standards for EMPs and develop or update, as necessary,
quantitative benchmarks that sufficiently describe the physical
characteristics of EMPs, including waveform and intensity, in a form that
is useful to and can be shared with owners and operators of critical
infrastructure.

(iv) Within 4 years of the date of this order, the Secretary of the
Interior shall complete a magnetotelluric survey of the contiguous United
States to help critical infrastructure owners and operators conduct EMP
vulnerability assessments.

                    (c) Evaluating approaches to mitigate the effects
                of EMPs.

(i) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and every 2 years thereafter,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of
Defense and Energy, and in consultation with the Director of OSTP, the
heads of other appropriate agencies, and private-sector partners as
appropriate, shall submit to the President, through the APNSA, a report
that analyzes the technology options available to improve the resilience of
critical infrastructure to the effects of EMPs. The Secretaries of Defense,
Energy, and Homeland Security shall also identify gaps in available
technologies and opportunities for future technological developments to
inform R&D activities.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of the activities directed by
subsections (b)(iii) and (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with the heads of other agencies and in
consultation with the private sector as appropriate, shall develop and
implement a pilot test to evaluate available engineering approaches for
mitigating the effects of EMPs on the most vulnerable critical
infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, as identified in subsection
(a)(ii) of this section.

(iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, and in
consultation with appropriate regulatory and utility commissions and other
stakeholders, shall identify regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms,
including cost recovery measures, that can enhance private-sector
engagement to address the effects of EMPs.

                    (d) Strengthening critical infrastructure to
                withstand the effects of EMPs.

(i) Within 90 days of completing the actions directed in subsection (c)(ii)
of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and in consultation with the heads of
other appropriate agencies and with the private sector as appropriate,
shall develop a plan to mitigate the effects of EMPs on the vulnerable
priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets identified
under subsection (a)(ii) of this section. The plan shall align with and
build on actions identified in reports required by Executive Order 13800 of
May 11, 2017 (Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and
Critical Infrastructure). The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
implement those elements of the plan that are consistent with Department of
Homeland Security authorities and resources, and report to the APNSA
regarding any additional authorities and resources needed to complete its
implementation. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, shall update the plan as necessary
based on results from the actions directed in subsections (b) and (c) of
this section.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of the actions identified in
subsection (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Energy, shall
conduct a pilot test to evaluate engineering approaches used to harden a
strategic military installation, including infrastructure that is critical
to supporting that installation, against the effects of EMPs.

(iii) Within 180 days of completing the pilot test described in subsection
(d)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall report to the
President, through the APNSA, regarding the cost and effectiveness of the
evaluated approaches.

                    (e) Improving response to EMPs.

(i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, in coordination with the heads of appropriate SSAs, shall review
and update Federal response plans, programs, and procedures to account for
the effects of EMPs.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of actions directed by subsection
(e)(i) of this section, agencies that support National Essential Functions
shall update operational plans documenting their procedures and
responsibilities to prepare for, protect against, and mitigate the effects
of EMPs.

(iii) Within 180 days of identifying vulnerable priority critical
infrastructure systems, networks, and assets as directed by subsection
(a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, and the Chairman
of the Federal Communications Commission, shall provide the Deputy
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and
the Director of OSTP with an assessment of the effects of EMPs on critical
communications infrastructure, and recommend changes to operational plans
to enhance national response and recovery efforts after an EMP.

                Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order
                shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or
the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

                    (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with
                applicable law and subject to the availability of
                appropriations.
                    (c) This order is not intended to, and does not,
                create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
                enforceable at law or in equity by any party against
                the United States, its departments, agencies, or
                entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any
                other person.

                    (Presidential Sig.)

                THE WHITE HOUSE,

                    March 26, 2019.